Diagnosis approach using bond graph and timed automata by Dhouibi, Hedi et al.
DIAGNOSIS APPROACH USING BOND GRAPH
AND TIMED AUTOMATA
Hedi Dhouibi, Maaref Bochra, Messaoud Hassani, Zineb Simeu-Abazi
To cite this version:
Hedi Dhouibi, Maaref Bochra, Messaoud Hassani, Zineb Simeu-Abazi. DIAGNOSIS AP-
PROACH USING BOND GRAPH AND TIMED AUTOMATA . MOSIM 2014, 10e`me
Confe´rence Francophone de Mode´lisation, Optimisation et Simulation, Nov 2014, Nancy,
France. <hal-01166661>
HAL Id: hal-01166661
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01166661
Submitted on 23 Jun 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
10
the
 International Conference of Modeling and Simulation - MOSIM’14 – November 5-7 - Nancy - France 
“Toward circular Economy” 
DIAGNOSIS APPROACH USING BOND GRAPH AND TIMED AUTOMATA  
 
 
H. Dhouibi, M. Bochra, M. Hassani 
 
LARATSI, National Engineering school of Monastir, 
Tunisia                                          
maaref_bochra@live.fr, hedi.dhouibi@laposte.net, 
Hassani.Messaoud@enim.rnu.tn 
Z. Simeu Abazi 
 
G-SCOP, Grenoble- IPN/UJF- Grenoble 1, CNRS, 
France                                                               
zineb.simeu-abazi@g-scop.grenoble-inp.fr  
ABSTRACT: The problem of fault diagnosis involves detecting, locating and identifying the considered faults 
occurring in the dynamical system. The aim of this paper is to explain the use of hybrid tool which combines Bond 
Graph (BG) and Timed Automata (TA).  These tools allow us, respectively, to detect the fault and find the cause of a 
system dysfunction. Due to the structural and causal properties of the bond graph tool, we use it to detect the incorrect 
behavior and then to isolate faults which can affect the physical process. But sometimes, some failures of the system 
components can not be identified by the Bond Graph model. Therefore, we use, in this case, the timed model (timed 
automata) in order to locate and identify these faults. And subsequently, the performances of the phase of fault location 
will be improved (i.e. isolation of non-isolable faults) thanks to the use of these tools (Bond Graph and Timed 
Automata). The proposed approach is then validated through simulation tests to a level regulation system.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The main purposes of this paper concern residual genera-
tion and fault isolation based on a new approach which 
combined the causal graphical approaches (Bond graph 
and causal graph) and the timed automata. The bond 
graph model is used to generate systematically a set of 
fault indicators called also analytical redundancy rela-
tions (ARRs) deals with the FDI (Gertler, 1998; Patton et 
al., 2000; Staroswiecki and Comtet-Verga, 2000). This 
modeling approach provides an effective tool for compo-
sitional modeling, by their representation and by phe-
nomena of storage, dissipation and transformation of 
energy thanks to the bond graph elements (R, C, I, TF, 
GY, ...), and also for fault detection and isolation (FDI) 
of dynamic systems (Cellier, 1991; Dean et al., 2000). 
ARRs are designed; the fault detection procedure checks 
the presence of fault indicated by a non-zero value of 
these indicators. The localization procedure by bond 
graph is based on the fault signature matrix generated 
from the ARRs. But this phase of location, generally, is 
not more effective thanks to not isolable of some defect. 
To improve performance of fault isolation, we use the 
timed automata. In the approach we propose here, the 
diagnosis system is based on checking the consistency 
between the time of failure occurrences and the inputs 
sequences. It is thus necessary to know the time trajecto-
ries. A dynamic model with temporal transitions, in our 
approach, is proposed for which the defective states are 
identified. The goal is to find the coherent diagnostic 
way, which corresponds to the defective evolution of the 
system. The verification of this model is based on the 
backward exploitation of the dynamic model, where all 
possible reverse paths are searched. The reverse path is 
the connection of the faulty state to the initial state.  
 
This paper is organized as follows: In the next section, a 
proposed procedure for FDI is described. Section 3 and 4 
give, respectively, an idea quantitative on bond graph 
(BG) and timed automata (TA) approaches, by using to 
develop diagnosis approach. In Section 5, an academical-
ly example is used to illustrate our approach. Finally, a 
conclusion is presented with some perspectives. 
2 PROPOSED DIAGNOSIS APPROCH   
The proposed FDI approach combines two tools: the 
bond graph and timed automata is shown in figure 1, 
where variables u and R are respectively input state and 
the set of residuals. 
 
 
Figure 1: Principle of the fault location 
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The quantitative approach is based on the bond graph 
model which allows the generation of the fault indicators 
and on the dynamic model (TA) which presents a tool of 
fault location and isolation. The exploitation of the data 
resulting from the comparison of the current functioning 
system with its bond graph model (figure 1) allows to 
generate a set of indicators of faults (residuals), which 
allows, thereafter, to detect any possible malfunctions 
and to locate the source of a fault from the fault signature 
matrix. But once where the fault is not identified by the 
bond graph model, the diagnostic technique for fault 
location is then based on time analysis by using the 
timed automata model, where the coherent trace is 
searched by the verification of elapsed time with global 
time of alarm. We consider a plant equipped with an 
alarm and with a global clock for synchronization. Alarm 
produces an error signal when a fault is detected. Our 
diagnosis task is to locate and identify all faults which 
can occur (figure 1). The aim is to find the coherent di-
agnostic path, which corresponds to the faulty evolution 
of the system. In our case verification (analysis) means 
searching accessible trace of timed automata (reverse 
path). This reverse path project the evolution of the sys-
tem, from a final faulty state to the initial state (Simeu, 
2010). The reverse path is also called diagnostic path. 
We suppose the initial state is known. Our task can be 
seen as retrace the automaton graph from the faulty 
states to the known origin state. The aim is to find from 
the set of reverse path the coherent ones. 
3 BOND GRAPH ANALYSIS 
Bond graphs are a domain-independent graphical 
description of dynamic behavior of different physical 
systems (mechanical, electrical, hydraulic …). The basis 
is that bond graphs are based on energy and energy 
exchange. From the structural and causal properties, the 
bond graph tool allows to highlight the effects and the 
causes, allowing, thereafter, to find the origins of alarms. 
BG modelling is a powerful tool for modelling 
engineering systems, especially when different physical 
domains are involved.  
 
The concept of bond graphs was originated by (H. M and 
Paynter, 1961). The idea was further developed by 
Karnopp and Rosenberg (Karnopp and Rosenberg, 
1974), such that it could be used in practice (Jean, 1989; 
Breedveld, 1986). A number of methods have been 
developed for fault detection and isolation. All methods 
of fault detection work by designing residual functions. 
The residual represents the difference between an 
estimated value and a measured one, which should be 
zero during normal operation (without fault), but large in 
the presence of faults (Cellier, 1991). This residual is 
generated from analytical redundancy relations (ARR). 
The ARRs are generated in the form of symbolic 
relations from a bond graph model in derivative 
causality. In the case where the complex bond graph 
model presents implicit relations, complex non-
linearities, the ARRs must be to generate numerically 
after the modifications considered necessary on the bond 
graph model in derivative causality. After these 
modifications (Samantaray et al., 2006), the diagnostics 
bond graph (DBG) model is obtained in which the inputs 
are values of sources and sensor measurements and the 
outputs are numerical values given by the detectors of 
numerical residuals. According to these modifications, 
each sensor is corresponds a numerical detector residual. 
Therefore, the number of residual generated is equal to 
the number of sensors present in the system. 
4 TIMED AUTOMATA 
The timed automata tool (Sava, 2001; Simeu et al., 2003) 
is defined as a finite state machine with a set of continu-
ous variables that are named clock. These variables 
evolve continuously in each location of the automata, 
according to an associated evolution function. As long as 
the system is in one state Li, the clock xi is continuously 
incremented. Its evolution is described by 1X  . The 
clocks are synchronized and change with the same step. 
An invariant is associated to each state. It corresponds to 
the conditions needed to remain in the state. The number 
of clocks depends on the parallelism in the system. The 
automata can stay in one state as long as the invariant 
condition is checked. Each transition of an automata is 
conditioned by an event or temporization called “guard” 
and its execution determines the discrete evolution of the 
variables according to its associated assignment. 
 
Let us consider the timed automata given in figure 2. 
This automata has two clocks x and y. The continuous 
evolution of time in this model is represented by 1x   
and the labeled arcs in the graph represent the model of 
discrete evolution. The guard in each arc is a transition 
labelling function that assigns firing conditions with the 
transitions of the automata. The affectation is a function 
that associates with each transition of the automata one 
relation that allows actualizing the value of continuous 
state space variables after the firing of a transition. The 
invariant in the state S0 and S1 are respectively y ≤ 5 
and x ≤ 8. The initial state of this system is represented 
by an input arc in the origin state (S0). In the dynamic 
model, active clocks are found in each state. A graphical 
interpretation of the timed automata is the automata 
graph (figure 2). 
 
  
Figure 2: Example of Timed Automata 
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In our case verification (analysis) means searching 
accessible trace of timed automata (reverse path). This 
reverse path project the evolution of the system, from a 
final faulty state to the initial state. We suppose the 
initial state is known. Our task can be seen as retrace the 
automaton graph from the faulty states to the known 
origin state. The aim is to find from the set of reverse 
path the coherent ones. The principle of the analysis is 
shown in automaton graph with fault model (figure 3). 
From fault model one can see that fault F1 can occurs 
from states 2, and the fault F2 from the state 3. The 
diagnostic model must be defined that if fault occurs in 
the system, fault must be located according the time 
instant t. If the fault occurs in the time t=4, it’s fault 
located as F1. In another case, the fault occurs in the 
time t=6, the fault F2 is located. 
 
 
Figure 3: Principle of the backward time analysis 
5 APPLICATION EXEMPLE 
5.1 Description of the system 
This unit  (figure 4) consists on a hydraulic circuit, with 
a bottom tank (1) and a superior process tank (2), both 
dual ones, two pumps of centrifugal circulation (3), two 
flowmeters with a manual control valve (4), three on/off 
solenoid valves (5) and a motorized proportional valve 
(infinitely variable) (6). Of course, together with the 
tubes, the union elbows, connections, feedthroungh, 
main valve and the appropriate drainage for the circuit 
operation.  
 
As additional fixed elements, there is also a turbine flow 
sensor that is installed in one of the upward lines of flow 
(8), and a temperature sensor located in a lateral bottom 
of the process tank (9) together with a serpentine with 
electric heating (11). The interchangeable additional 
elements are an agitator (10), the immersion level sensor 
should be located in the process tank (12) and the pH 
sensor (solenoid), can be in the process tank or also in 
the second tank (13), to study the effect of the time out. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Main diagram of the equipment 
5.2 Operation of the subsystem 
For the level, flow and temperature control test, the 
liquid (water) is impelled from the tank by the pump, 
located to the left of the front of the equipment, going 
through the flowmeter, the solenoid valve (usually 
open), the motorized valve, the turbine (flow sensor) and 
the process tank. It is possible to use the second pump in 
the level tests, as it will be indicated. The process tank is 
divided in two halves, with an orifice between them that 
allows their communication or isolation. The right 
compartment has an overflow of variable level (that it 
prevents the complete overflow of the tank, and it allows 
to modify its effective liquid volume), two drains with 
solenoid valves with different Cv (normally closed), and 
a third one with a normal drainage valve. The left 
compartment is only connected to a drainage valve. The 
level control tests require all the elements of the circuit 
and of the tank, besides the sensor located in it. In some 
experiments, it is required the second pump placed to the 
right-hand side of the equipment. The water is heated by 
an electric resistance AR-1(11). The action of heating is 
conditioned by the order of All or Nothing level sensor 
AN-1(14). 
 
We include in the following table 1 the constituent 
elements of the equipment and a brief description of 
each. 
 
Identification Description 
ST-1 Upper tank Temperature Sensor 
SC-1 Flowmeter 
SpH-1 Ph meter 
SN-1 Upper tank Water level sensor 
AN-1 Upper Tank Water Level Switch 
SP-1 Upper Tank Pressure sensor 
AVS-1 Upper tank Inlet solenoid valve 
AVS-2 
Quick outlet Solenoid Valve of the 
upper tank 
AVS-3 
Slow outlet Solenoid Valve of the 
upper tank 
AVP-1 Proportional Valve at the upper tank 
AA-1 Upper tank stirrer 
AR-1 Electric Resistance 
AB-1 Recirculation Left Pump (Slow) 
AB-2 Recirculation Right Pump (Quick) 
VR-1 Manual valve flow meter (Left) 
VR-2 Manual valve flow meter (Right) 
Table 1: Description of the constituent elements of the 
system 
 
5.3 Fault detection based on bond graph 
For this unit, we applied, with the bond graph model, the 
main steps of the Fault Detection and Isolation. The 
detection procedure is based on the generation of fault 
indicators from the diagnosis bond graph (DBG) model 
by following the causal paths. The diagnosis bond graph 
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(DBG) model of the system obtained from the word 
bond graph model (figure 5) is given in figure 6.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Word Bond Graph Model of System 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Diagnosis Bond Graph Model of System 
 
The bond graph representation of the coupling of the two 
hydraulic and thermal phenomena is an open research 
domain. Certain authors represent the coupling by a 
multiport element R (Jean and Ould Bouamama, 2000). 
In this paper, the CETF element indicated in the 
diagnosis bond graph (DBG) model in figure 6 
represents the coupling element of the two hydraulic and 
thermal phenomena. The causal form of the CETF 
coupling element for thermo-fluid is given in figure 7. 
  
2H  
T1 T2 
 
1H  
m  
CETF 
 
Figure 7: Representation of the CETF coupling element 
for thermo-fluid 
 
Thus, the representation of energy storage in the bond 
graph model is represented by the C element. Therefore, 
the Ch and Ct elements shown in the diagnosis bond 
graph (DBG) model in figure 6 respectively represent, 
hydraulic energy storage and thermal energy storage. In 
the diagnosis bond graph model (figure 6), the effort 
sensor, :  1De SP , in inverted causality is considered as a 
source of effort modulated by the measured value which 
corresponds to a numerical residual represented by the 
*  3Df r  element. The modifications made to this type of 
detector are shown in figure 8.  
 
 
 
Figure 8: (a) Effort sensor, De, in inverted causality, (b) 
corresponding substitution and residual detector obtained 
 
The same reasoning applies to effort sensors :  1De SN   
and :  1De ST  . For the flow sensor, :  1Df SC  , whose cau-
sality is not inverted, the modifications proposed are 
given by the figure 9. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: (a) Flow sensor, Df, in non-inverted causality, 
(b) corresponding substitution and residual detector 
obtained 
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The DBG, in figure 6, has six access points 
(corresponding to the six sensors of the system) and six 
outputs (corresponding to the six numerical residuals) as 
shown in the block diagram in figure 10. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Block diagram of DBG 
 
5.4 ARRs generation 
Methods to derive ARRs from bond graph models by 
applying the causality inversion algorithm, have been 
presented in (Breedveld, 1986; Ould Bouamama et al., 
2003), which use structural and causal properties. In our 
case the diagnosis bond graph (DBG) model allows to 
obtain the values of numerical residuals and also the 
fault signature matrix Sij. In fact, the latter is essential 
for the localization of defects that can arise during the 
system operation. The analysis of the causal paths of the 
unknown greatness towards the detector is used to 
generate the fault signature matrix (Table 2). Thus, a 
residual ri is sensitive to a failure in the component 
Compj if and only if the variable of this component is 
found in the causal path allowing the generation of the 
residual ri. 
For example, the variables of components intervening in 
the detector of residual r1, which is represented in the 
bond number 17' in figure 6, are determined by the 
following causal paths: 
  
The components involved in the residual r1, from these 
causal paths, are thus given by the vector K1= [SC-1, 
RVR-1, RAVS-1, RVR-2, RAB-1, RAB-2, SN-1, LC, 
RAVP-1, tank T1, tank T1']. This signature can be 
written in the terms of components K1= [SC-1, Valve 
VR-1, Valve AVS-1, Valve VR-2, Pump AB-1, Pump AB-
2, SN-1, LC, Valve AVP-1, tank T1, tank T1']. Thus, the 
application of this procedure on all numerical detectors 
of residuals leads to the fault signature matrix Sij. The 
failure signature matrix, for all the devices (components, 
sensors, and controllers) of the level regulation system 
example, in figure 4, is given in Table 2. 
 
Components r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 Db Ib 
u1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
u2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Df :SC-1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
De :SN-1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
De :AN-1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
De :SP-1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
De :ST-1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Left main 
tank T1 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Right main 
tank T1’ 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Left     
treatment 
tank T2 
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Right   
treatment 
tank T2’ 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Pump AB-1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Pump AB-2 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Valve VR-1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Valve VR-2 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Valve AVS-1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Valve AVP-1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Valve V-3 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Electric Re-
sistance AR-
1 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Level con-
troller LC 
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Temperature 
controller 
TC 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Table 2: Fault signature matrix 
 
It is important to underline that this fault signature 
matrix built by following the causal paths corresponds to 
a well determined configuration and therefore to an 
associated model. The form of the equations for each 
bond graph element is then the same during the whole 
period of functioning in a given configuration. For 
example, the total blocking of the valve AVS-1 
represented by the element RAVS-1 causes the rupture 
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of all the causal paths of (and towards) this element. By 
analyzing this matrix, we see well that the variable 
associated with each component is present in at least one 
residual. So all system failures are theoretically 
detectable (Db = 1). 
Moreover, the signatures of components SN-1, SC-1, u1, 
u2, SP-1, AB-1, V-3, tank T2, tank T2 'and LC are 
unique. Thus, the failures of these components are 
isolatable (Ib = 1). 
On the other hand, the signatures of components AN-
1and AR-1 are identical what means that the failures 
affecting these components cannot be isolated (Ib = 0). 
 
Our contribution in this paper is the use of timed 
automata for the isolation of these non-isolable 
components by Bond Graph model. 
 
5.5 Fault isolation base on timed automata 
The timed automaton model of the level regulation sys-
tem of figure 4 will become bulky and complicated by its 
significant number of fault state. And the visualization of 
this model will become, thereafter, incomprehensible. 
For this reason and for the phase of localization of faults 
(valve fault AVP-1, sensor fault AN-1, valve fault AVS-
2) we consider only part of the model shown in figure 
11. The goal being the study of level in a tank by the 
action on valve AVP1 and also by two sensors SN1 and 
AN1, respectively, of high and low level measurement. 
The valve AVS2 allows to drain the tank. 
We use the timed automaton model for isolate faults in 
the components (AVP-1, AN-1, AVS-2) which are not 
identifiable (see table 2). 
 
 
Figure 11: Schema of tank system 
 
In the initial state, the tank is empty. At the moment 
when contact "On" closes, the tank is filled by the prod-
uct thanks to the opening of valve AVP1. When the tank 
level SN1 is reached, the valve AVP1 is closed and 
AVS2 is opened up to the level is below AN1. 
 
Control sequence 
(1) S0: The tank is empty. Sensors AN1 and SN1 are in 
the state 0. 
(2) S1: The "On" button is activated. Valve AVP1 is 
open, a liquid flows into tank up to level SN1. 
(3) S2: If level SN1 is reached then valve AVP1 is 
closed and AVS2 is opened, the tank is emptied up to the 
empty level (AN1=0). Then the cycle starts again. 
 
The phase of fault location consists in finding how to 
isolate a fault, in other words how the fault going to 
propagate in the system. This phase is based on time 
analysis where the coherent path is searched by the 
checking between input sequences and the moment of 
failure events. Therefore, it is necessary to know the time 
trajectories. 
In our case, we consider eight faults and their failure 
modes which are summarized in table 3. 
 
N° Failure mode  Réf 
1 Does not detect the rising level AN1_SO 
2 Does not detect the lower level AN1_SC 
3 Does not detect the rising level SN1_SO 
4 Does not detect the lower level SN1_SC 
5 
Remains closed during an opening 
request 
AVP1_SC 
6 
Remains open during a closing 
request 
AVP1_SO 
7 
Remains closed during an opening 
request 
AVS2_SC 
8 
Remains open during a closing 
request 
AVS2_SO 
Table 3: Faults and their failure modes 
 
Before passing at the step of fault location, a means of 
detection, for each fault listed in table 3, is set up (see 
table 4). 
  
faults Detection parameters  State 
AN1 
Stuck_Open 
From the opening of the 
drainage valve AVS2, sen-
sor AN1 should not pass to 
state 0 before 321.9 sec. 
S3 
AN1 
Stuck_Close 
Sensor AN1 will have to 
pass to state 0; 321.9 sec 
after the opening of the 
drainage valve. 
S4 
SN1 
Stuck_Open 
Sensor SN1 must pass to 
state 1; 97.9 sec after the 
opening of the valve 
AVP1. 
S0 
AVP1 
Stuck_Close 
SN1 
Stuck_Close Sensor SN1 must pass to 
state 0 directly after the 
activation of the valve 
AVS2. 
S2 
AVP1 
Stuck_Open 
AVS2 
Stuck_Close 
AVS2 
Stuck_Open 
Sensor SN1 must pass to 
state 1; 60 sec after the 
opening of the valve 
AVS2. 
S1 
Table 4: Detection parameters of the process 
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For the eight faults listed in table 3, we use only five 
states of detection (S0, S1 ... S4). The table 5 below 
shows us the necessary conditions to localize the defects. 
 
 
State Localization parameters faults 
S0 
The AN1 sensor, passes to 
state 0; 11.9 sec after acti-
vation of the S0 detection. 
SN1 
Stuck_Open 
The AN1 sensor, remains in 
state 0; 20 sec after activa-
tion state S0 detection. 
AVP1 
Stuck_Close 
S1 
the detection suffices to the 
localization 
AVS2 
Stuck_Close 
 
S2 
The AN1 sensor, passes to 
state 0; 100 sec after the 
activation of the state S2 
detection. 
SN1 
Stuck_Close 
The AN1 sensor, passes to 
state 1; 100 sec after activa-
tion state S2 detection. 
AVS2 
Stuck_Close 
the detection suffices to the 
localization 
AVP1 
Stuck_Open 
S3 
the detection suffices to the 
localization 
AN1 
Stuck_Open 
S4 
the detection suffices to the 
localization 
AN1 
Stuck_Close 
Table 5: Localization parameters of the process 
 
The global automata graph which contains the faultless 
functioning states and all the faulty states for diagnosis 
of the level regulation system is shown in figure 12. 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Diagnosis Automata Model of System  
 
 If the model of the whole system is built, the reading of 
the evolution of the system becomes very difficult. The 
use of the timed automaton tool has only one drawback it 
is the explosion in the number of transitions between 
states in the three modes of operation. This problem of 
explosion in number of arcs is resolved by the use of the 
state flow tool (see figure 13). 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Isolation Model of System 
 
The next step in our diagnosis is verification of this 
model by analyzing time back. It means to verify if all 
failed states in the dynamic model (TA) are reachable. 
When the time of occurrence of the defect is considered, 
the backward time analysis searches the possible reverse 
path to localize the failure according the time of fault 
occurrence. 
 
In our case exploitation means searching accessible trace 
according the time from a final faulty state to the initial 
state of automaton denoted by reverse path. Therefore 
the initial state must be known. Our task can be seen as 
retrace the automaton graph from the faulty states to the 
known origin state. The aim is to find from the set of 
reverse path the coherent ones. 
 
This algorithm based on the backward time analysis al-
lows as from the moment of appearance of alarm, to lo-
calize the defect. 
Step 1: Calculate the duration of an operating cycle (in 
our case, it is 418.9 sec). 
Step 2: Calculate the number of cycles made by the pro-
cess before the activation of the alarm. 
             Number of cycles = round (Talarm/418.9) 
Step 3: Calculate the weight of the path: 
             Path = Talarm - (418.9 * (number of cycle)) 
Step 4: Compare the path value obtained with the weight 
of the different paths.  
 
On the table below are listed the weights of different 
paths. 
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Fault Time of path in sec 
AN1 Stuck_Open 91 
AN1 Stuck_Close 11 
SN1 Stuck_Open 200 
SN1 Stuck_Close 208.2 
AVP1 Stuck_Open 209.1 
AVP1 Stuck_Close 130.2 
AVS2 Stuck_Open 12.2 
AVS2 Stuck_Close 208 
Table 6: Weights of different paths 
6 SIMULATION RESULT 
To illustrate the effectiveness of the diagnosis approach, 
we present simulation results of the level regulation 
system example. The bond graph and timed automata 
models of the system was constructed using MATLAB 
SIMULINK and state flow. Block diagram model of the 
Bond graph and block program are developed by the 
authors which are not presented in this paper. 
 
Two failure scenarios have been simulated. The first 
concerns a failure of the flow sensor SC-1 during a time 
interval ranging from 3 to 15 s. Figure 14 shows the 
response of the residuals r1 and r5 and their sensitivity to 
this failure. If we refer to the signature of the component 
SC-1 (flow sensor) given in the table 2 we note that this 
result is well consistent with what is expected; in other 
words, in case of failure of the component SC-1 (flow 
sensor) only the residuals r1 and r5 will exceed their 
respective threshold. 
 
We will therefore be able to find this fault by the bond 
graph model. 
Figure 14: Response of the residuals following a failure 
at flow sensor SC-1 
 
In the second failure scenario, the valve AVP1 has been 
blocked. Figure 15 allows us to compare a normal 
operation (left part) of the process with a state of faulty 
operation (right part). On the right figure, despite the 
request of opening of the valve AVP1, it remains closed. 
This moment represents the occurrence of a failure. 
Toccurence = 430.2 sec. Then, the sensor SN1, remains 
in state 0; 97.9 sec after the request for the opening of 
the valve AVP1. This moment represents the moment of 
detection of the fault. Tdetection = 528.1 sec. S0 state 
(see figure 13). 
Finally the sensor AN1, remains in state 0; 20 sec after 
the activation of the detection state. This time 
corresponds to the fault location. Tlocalization = 548.1 
sec. AVP1_SC state (see figure 13). 
 
This figure analysis shows that: 
 -Detection time = Tdetection - Toccurence = 97.9 sec.  
 -Localization time = Tlocalization - Tdetection = 20 sec. 
 
 
Figure 15: Diagnostic for the fault AVP1 Stuck- Close 
 
Verification by the backward time analysis 
An alarm appears to Talarm = 548.1 sec (the time of 
appearance of alarm is the time of fault location, Talarm 
= Tlocalization = 548.1 sec)  
According to the verification algorithm by the backward 
time analysis we have: 
1 - The duration of an operating cycle is 418.9 sec.  
2 - Number of cycles = round (548.1 / 418.9) = 1  
3 - Path = 548.1 - (418.9 * 1) = 129.2 sec  
Therefore, from the table of the path (table 6), we can 
conclude that the valve AVP1 remains closed during an 
opening request (AVP1 Stuck_Close). 
 
We will therefore be able to find this fault by the timed 
automata model because this fault cannot be located by 
the bond graph model. 
7 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a method for fault detection and isolation is 
presented. It is combining graphical approaches (BG) 
and the model of dynamical system (timed automata). 
Bond graph is used for detecting systematically actua-
tors, sensor and structural fault. By following the proce-
dure of generation numerical residuals from the DBG 
model, the construction signatures of the different com-
Valve command AVP1      
 
State of valve AVP1 
 
 Tank Level 
 
Level sensor SN1 
 
Sensor of draining AN1 
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ponents of the system is then used to detect the various 
probable failures in system components. The procedure 
of fault location by the timed automata tool is used when 
the fault cannot be identified by the bond graph model. 
This approach is based on the trajectory and the temporal 
transition of the model which must be identified for all 
modes considered (faultless and faulty mode). And in 
order to improve the performance of the phase fault loca-
tion by timed automata, the verification by the backward 
time analysis is presented. This verification is based on 
the backward exploitation of the dynamic model (TA), 
where according the time of fault occurrence, all possible 
reverse paths of the faulty state to the initial state are 
searched. 
 
The next step is interested in the event of fault diagnosis 
in the presence of common causes.   
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